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Abstract
The European Union has set ambitious targets for expanding renewable energy to
meet emission reduction goals. After a period of subsidy-driven investments, the costs
of renewables decreased strongly and renewable support schemes shift towards more
market-based approaches. We therefore analyse the market-based profitability of wind
onshore and offshore and solar PV across Europe to determine where it is optimal to
invest and understand which factors drive the profitability of investments. We use
a power systems model to simulate the whole European electricity market in 2030.
Using the renewables’ revenues determined by the model, we calculate the profitability
of each technology in each country. We also analyse how effective renewables are in
terms of emission reduction. Investments are found not to be homogeneously profitable
across Europe, i.e. cooperation between European countries can be expected to achieve
the overall targets at lower costs than nationally-driven approaches. We also find that
in many countries, wind onshore and solar PV are profitable by 2030 in absence
of any financial support, whereas wind offshore does never seem profitable without
support. Finally, RES expansion alone will not guarantee an effective reduction of
CO2 emissions.
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- Profitability of solar PV, wind onshore and wind offshore compared across Europe
- Power systems optimisation model used to simulate whole European electricity
market
- Wind onshore and PV profitable by 2030 without financial support in many
countries
- Wind offshore not profitable without financial support
- RES deployment does not automatically guarantee effective reduction of emissions
Table 1: Nomenclature
Symbol Explanation Unit
Objective
Γ total generation costs €
Parameters
γg,f generation costs of generator g using fuel f €/MWhel
φf fuel price of fuel f €/GJ
ǫ CO2 emission price €/t CO2
ηg heat rate of generator g GJfuel/MWhel
σf specific CO2 content of fuel f t CO2/GJ
αg other variable operation costs of generator g €/MWhel
µg max power output of generator g MWhel/h
χ loss of load costs €/MWhel
ψ surplus costs €/MWhel
δc,t power demand for country c at time step t MWhel/h
ρc,t renewable power generation for country c at time step t MWhel/h
Variables
Πg,t power output of generator g at time step t MWhel/h
Λc,t system loss of load for country c at time step t MWhel/h
Ξc,t system surplus for country c at time step t MWhel/h
Γg total generation costs of generator g €
X total loss of load costs €
Ψ total surplus costs €
Indices
c country index -
f fuel type index -
g generator index -
t time step index -
1 Introduction
The European Commission (EC) and the European Council set ambitious targets for 2030
to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from the energy sector and secure clean and
efficient energy in the European Union (EU).1 In 2014, EU countries agreed that by 2030,
the share of renewables should be 27% of total energy consumption in order to achieve
1See EC Directive 2009/28, [1] and [2].
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the overall target of 40% GHG emission reduction [3]. This target holds at the EU level,
so all countries should work together either by reducing the energy demand or increasing
generation from renewable energy sources (RES), to achieve the overall goals.
Electricity generation is one of the sectors affected by the EU targets together with
transport, agriculture and industry, as it is one of the major sectors responsible for total
emissions [4]. Following the track started with the 2020 targets on emission reductions,
renewable electricity generation (RES-E) should increase to 49% of total electricity demand
by 2030 in order to be consistent with the overall target on total energy demand, as noted
by the Commission [3] in their own impact assessment analysis. In 2018, these targets
were made more ambitious, as the target share of renewables on total energy consumption
in 2030 has been increased to 32% of total energy consumption [5], setting the ground for
the 2050 European carbon neutrality target.
The installed capacity in renewable energy has increased strongly during the last
decade, when every EU country set up different incentives to promote the investment
in renewable generation. There are several studies that focus on the costs and the regu-
latory changes needed to promote the investments in renewable energy. All these studies
highlight that subsidies given to renewables are positively correlated with the investment
in this type of generation in all EU countries. Papaefthymiou and Dragoon [6] and Held
et al. [7] analyse the impact of increasing RES-E penetration in the EU system and focus
on the associated distribution network costs. Other studies [8, 9, 10, 11, 12] analyse how
regulation and subsidies are necessary to encourage the investment in renewable energy.
During the same decade, however, renewable power generation technologies have ma-
tured strongly. Until 2030, investment costs associated with renewables are expected to
decrease further, making the investment in renewable energy more attractive to market
participants [13]. As a result, renewable support schemes have begun to shift towards
more market-based approaches in recent years [14]. A careful analysis of the market-
based profitability of investments in renewable technologies therefore becomes more and
more relevant. In the absence of subsidies, it is expected that natural resource conditions,
including the availability of wind and solar irradiation with respect to which European
countries differ quite strongly, become increasingly important as part of this analysis.
Moreover, financial market conditions differ significantly between countries, which is ex-
pected to play an important role.
This work therefore focuses on addressing the following two overarching research ques-
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tions:
• How profitable are renewables in the market across Europe and what are the major
drivers of their profitability?
• How effective are renewables in reducing CO2 emissions across Europe?
Despite the importance of the subject, there are not many studies focusing on the
profitability or effectiveness of renewable technologies in 2030 or beyond, in particular
when it comes to comparing countries across Europe. A review of methods adopted
to optimally locate investments in renewables is provided by Tan et al. [15]. Duscha
et al. [16] combined short and long term simulations to find the optimal technological and
economical pattern to meet the emission targets up to 2050. The authors examine the
impact of different RES targets on the EU economy and find that the Commission’s overall
renewable energy target should be a minimum target rather than the maximum level of
RES. The authors show that a RES penetration going beyond the overall EU target results
in higher economic benefits for the Union. As the investment costs of RES decrease over
time, the authors highlight that new investments rely on convenient cost of capital, and
the regulation should then focus on reducing that in the next years. Finally, the authors
point out that offshore wind and tidal energy are not economically efficient, so subsidies
would need to be provided in order to incentivise investments in these technologies if
desired. Safarzyńska and van den Bergh [17] focus on the financial stability associated
with the investment in renewables and find that investments in gas fired plants instead of
renewable technologies would be beneficial in countries in which coal plants are still active
and play a major role in generation. Finally, Knopf et al. [18] find that the cost-efficient
share of RES-E to meet the European targets in 2030 ranges from 43% to 56%, raising
the question about the profitability of new investments above the initial threshold of 49%
identified by the Commission. However, no specific focus is given to the profitability of
specific technologies.
In addition, several works focus on costs linked to RES projects and use the Levelised
Cost of Electricity (LCOE) to assess the feasibility of renewable-driven electrified systems.2
However, while being commonly applied, the use of LCOE in such a context is discussed
controversially in literature. For instance, [22] as well as [23] emphasise that LCOE as a
metric to assess the viability of investments focuses on the cost side only but is not able to
capture effects such as the market value of different (renewable) generation technologies.
2See, among others [19],[20] [21].
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Moreover, [24] highlights the limitations of approaches, such as the LCOE, which are based
on uniform cost of capital assumptions across projects and countries.
In this work we therefore investigate whether the investment in specific renewable
technologies is profitable across Europe. We focus on solar PV, wind onshore and wind
offshore investments, as significant investments in additional hydro capacity are rather
unlikely and limitations to the feedstock potential are found to limit the expansion of
biomass for electricity only generation [25]. In particular, we compare several scenarios
to determine under which conditions investment in renewables would be profitable in
each country without additional financial support. For this purpose, we use a power
systems model to simulate the market-based revenues of different renewable technologies
across Europe. We then use the revenues and costs to calculate two different measures
of profitability: the internal rate of return (IRR), which takes into account the (natural)
resource-driven profitability of the investment in renewables and the net present value
(NPV), which incorporates the cost of capital of the projects, which may vary across
countries and technologies.
In a first step, we focus on the (natural) resource-driven aspects of profitability, i.e.
we calculate the IRR without considering and comparing financing conditions and their
impact on costs of capital between the countries [26, 27]. Although the importance of
providing favourable conditions to credit access for green projects has recently been high-
lighted by [28], quantifying the cost of capital for several technologies in different countries
is not easy, given the limited amount of information available [27]. While the cost of capital
is available for almost all countries in Europe for wind onshore ([27], [29]), cost of capital
for solar PV and wind offshore is available for much fewer countries only. In the absence of
cost of capital information across Europe, the IRR therefore seems like the natural choice
to compare the (natural resource-driven) profitability of RES investments across Europe
- acknowledging that the IRR does not consider any information about financial market
conditions.
In a second step, we then use the information provided by [27] to calculate the NPVs of
the investments for those technologies and countries, where cost of capital data is available.
The differing weighted average cost of capital (WACC) assumptions between technologies
and countries account for the fact that investments in renewables incorporate technology-
specific risks (such as learning experience - [30] and [27]) as well as country-specific risks
and the international conditions of credit access ([26],[27]).
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Finally, we use the power systems model’s output to analyse and compare RES shares
and emissions by country and discuss the determinants of CO2 emissions as well as the
effectiveness of renewables on reducing same.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the methodol-
ogy and data used. Section 3 presents our results, which we discuss in section 4. Section
5 concludes.
2 Methodology and data
2.1 Methodology
We use the Artelys Crystal Super Grid power systems optimisation model to simulate the
European electricity market in 2030 (EU28 plus Switzerland and Norway).3 The objective
function (eq. 1) of the model is the minimisation of the total generation costs Γg of all
generators g (eqs. 2+3), loss of load costs X (eq. 4) and surplus costs Ψ (eq. 5) across
the EU to meet demand δc,t in each country c at an hourly resolution t and subject to
technical constraints of generators and interconnectors. Table 1 provides an overview of
the nomenclature used within this paper.
min Γ =
∑
g
Γg +X +Ψ (1)
Γg =
∑
t
Πg,t · γg,f (2)
γg,f = (φf + ǫ · σf ) · ηg + αg (3)
X =
∑
c
∑
t
Λc,t · χ (4)
Ψ =
∑
c
∑
t
Ξc,t · ψ (5)
The model optimises the power outputs Πg,t ≤ µg of each generator g at each time step
t considering a number of constraints for each generator such as µ constraints or ramping
constraints, as well as interconnection constraints and using load δc,t and renewable gener-
3See: https://www.artelys.com. We thank Artelys for the provision of the software and their support.
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ation ρc,t time series data as exogenous input. The main decision variables are the power
outputs Πg,t as well as the system loss of load Λc,t and the system surplus Ξc,t for each
country c at each time step t. For further information on the model, please see Bossavy
et al. [31].
In these simulations a competitive market is assumed across the EU (i.e. no market
power and power plants bid their short run marginal cost) and we assume perfect fore-
sight, whereby the model has full knowledge of all input variables such as demand and
variable renewable generation output. This hypothesis does not allow us to investigate
the potential beneficial effects of competition in mitigating anti-competitive behaviour in
different markets, as noted by Neuhoff et al. [32]. The resulting market price is calculated
as the marginal price at member state level and does not include any extra revenues from
potential balancing, reserve or capacity markets or costs such as grid infrastructure cost,
capital costs or taxes.
For the economic assessment, we first calculate the internal rate of return (IRR) for
solar PV, wind onshore and wind offshore at member state level. We use the IRR to com-
pare the (natural) resource-related profitability of investments across Europe and deemed
the IRR to be most appropriate for this purpose.
The IRR is the interest rate i that leads to an NPV or annuity of €0 including the
cash flows CFt (revenues and expenses, including investments CF0) over all time periods
t ∈ {0, ..., T} of an investment project, where T is the project’s lifetime (see equation (6)).
NPV =
T∑
t=0
1
(1 + i)t
CFt ≡ 0 (6)
.
Second, where available, we use the WACC data provided by [27] to calculate NPVs
(where the WACCs are inserted as i in equation 6) associated with the different renewable
technologies. As noted previously, the WACC data provided reflects technology-specific
as well as country-specific risks associated with renewable power projects.
As shown in Section 3.5, we consider different lifetimes of the projects (with our baseline
being 20 years). Artelys calculates annual revenues based on the hourly generation by
technology and country and hourly prices by country assuming marginal costs of zero for
the considered technologies. Capital and fixed operational expenditures are considered
ex-post and, together with the revenues calculated by Artelys, provide input to our IRR
calculations according to equation (6). We consider the year 2030 as a ’snapshot’ and
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assume that each technology (solar PV, wind onshore and wind offshore) in each country
has the same revenue for each year of its lifetime. We acknowledge that this is a limitation.
However, given that the main focus of our analysis is the comparison between countries
across Europe, we expect that the impact of this simplification is limited.
2.2 Data
The input data for our analysis can be structured into three main categories: a) supply
and demand data for modelling the European power system, b) fuel and carbon prices,
and c) capital and fixed operational expenditures of the considered RES-E technologies.
a) Supply and demand data
The supply and demand input data to Artelys are largely based on Deane et al. [33].
This includes data on the generation portfolio and demand for the 28 European member
states from the 2016 European Commission modelling of a Reference Scenario (PRIMES)
of the future European Energy system.4 The Reference Scenario is one vision of the
European power system in 2030 based on business-as-usual assumptions, including full
implementation of European climate and energy policies adopted by December 2014 to
achieve a renewable electricity penetration of 49% in 2030 up from 27.5% in 2014.5 Note
that the 2030 portfolio in the PRIMES 2016 scenario does not exactly match the recent
EU target to achieve 32% of renewables in final energy consumption by 2030 (see [34]).
The projections used here are designed to meet a 49% target for renewable electricity.
4PRIMES is a partial equilibrium model that provides projections of detailed energy balances, both
for demand and supply, CO2 emissions, investment in demand and supply, energy technology penetration,
prices and costs”. The projections are set up in order to meet the EU 2016 targets on emissions for 2030
(see http://ec.europa.eu/environment/archives/air/models/primes.htm.
5The generation mixes of Switzerland and Norway are not included in the PRIMES scenario. Swiss
data was developed based on data available from the Federal Department of the Environment, Transport,
Energy and Communications (DETEC). Norwegian data was developed based on data available from the
Norwegian government (see: https://www.regjeringen.no) for thermal power plants and the Norwegian
water resources and energy directorate (NVE, see: https://www.nve.no) for renewables including hydro
power.
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Table 2: Installed RES capacity, MW, by country, 2030
Country Wind Onshore Wind Offshore Solar Hydro Other Renewables
AT 4,545 0 2,821 13,756 815
BE 3,557 3,350 3,818 1,484 820
BG 2,122 0 2,572 2,338 101
CH 834 0 5,272 16,587 0
CY 229 0 529 0 11
CZ 488 0 2,391 1,109 274
DE 57,796 9,418 63,959 13,102 7,065
DK 4,134 2,318 838 10 2,870
EE 445 0 1 8 154
ES 29,824 64 24,564 16,795 1,923
FI 2,763 152 19 3,461 3,330
FR 23,717 7,055 25,382 28,803 4,350
GR 6,038 0 5,616 3,579 232
HR 682 0 686 2,190 29
HU 477 0 106 57 409
IE 4,003 131 19 587 208
IT 15,574 3 24,562 18,939 6,182
LT 467 0 74 116 139
LU 302 0 131 1,345 35
LV 238 48 2 1,589 108
MT 0 0 198 0 2
NI 1,525 500 4 0 133
NL 6,975 3,121 5,586 37 2,308
NO 1,000 0 15 30,495 155
PL 9,442 897 99 1,039 2,105
PT 6,275 28 2,172 9,971 693
RO 6,017 0 2,223 6,645 157
SE 9,013 0 88 16,742 3,161
SI 242 0 779 1,284 118
SK 19 0 680 1,725 332
UK 18,550 12,846 11,040 4,624 17,233
Total 217,292 39,930 186,243 198,416 55,451
In addition to the data of the PRIMES Reference Scenario, hourly wind power gen-
eration for each Member State was taken from Aparicio et al. [35]. Hourly solar profiles
for each Member State were developed using NREL’s PVWatts® Calculator web applica-
tion, which determines the electricity production of photovoltaic systems based on system
location and basic system design parameters. Wind and solar profiles on the one hand
as well as demand profiles on the other hand are taken from the same meteorological
year (2012) so as to account for the weather-related correlations between these profiles
and ensure consistent model input. Installed capacity and hourly generation profiles are
considered at a country level, so our model does not take into account the location of
different generators within each country. Capacity factors and generation profiles are as-
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sumed to be representative of an ’average location’ for each country and technology (solar
PV, wind onshore and wind offshore). We acknowledge that this assumption is simplistic
and that capacity factors typically decrease over time because of (i) wear and tear and
(ii) reduced ’quality’ of locations with increasing penetration as the ’best’ locations are
exploited first. At the same time, however, technological advances and repowering lead
to increasing capacity factors. We assume that these competing effects even out and the
overall generation for each country and technology is in line with the PRIMES scenario.
Finally, our model includes the network interconnection capacities between EU countries,
as described in ENTSOE [36] for 2030.
The installed RES capacities by country, which are taken from PRIMES, are sum-
marised in Table 2.6 In this paper, RES capacities include hydro and thermal RES, where
the latter is the sum of biomass, geothermal and other renewables. Table 2 reveals that the
installed renewable capacity is not distributed homogeneously across Europe. Countries
in the South, such as Spain and Portugal, have a higher proportion of solar generation
than countries like Belgium or Ireland. Northern countries are rich in wind generation,
and Central European countries have a variable proportion of both resources.
b) Fuel and carbon prices
The fuel prices used in our analysis are taken from DECC [37] and summarised in
Table 3. The generators’ costs are based on fuel costs, emission costs and heat rates.7
Table 3: Fuel price assumptions, (€2010)
€/GJ Nuclear Coal Gas (CCGT, OCGT, derived gas) Oil Carbon
Low 2.00 2.40 5.70 10.00 20.00
Baseline 2.00 2.90 8.50 14.80 37.00
High 2.00 3.70 12.30 21.50 40.00
Data source: DECC [37]. Exchange rate €/GBP=0.858
c) RES capital and fixed operational expenditures
As in Slednev et al. [38], capital and fixed operational expenditures are taken from
Taylor et al. [39]. For 2015, their assumptions are 1,810 US$/kW for solar PV, 1,560
6Data on installed capacity for conventional generation are also taken from PRIMES and are summarised
in the Appendix
7Production costs for power plant type i, inclusive of CO2, are calculated as:
P rodCosti = F uelP ricei ∗ HeatRatei + ET S ∗ (HeatRatei ∗ CO2EmissRatei) (7)
The assumed CO2 emission rates are 93.6 kg/GJ for coal, 55.9 kg/GJ for gas and 77 kg/GJ for oil.
10
US$/kW for wind onshore and 4,650 US$/kW for wind offshore translating into 1,629 €/kW
for solar PV, 1,404 €/kW for wind onshore and 4,185 €/kW for wind offshore assuming
an exchange rate of 1 US$= 0.90 €. For 2025, Taylor et al. [39] assume technology costs
of 790 US$/kW for solar PV, 1,370 US$/kW for wind onshore and 3,950 US$/kW for
wind offshore translating into 711 €/kW for solar PV, 1,233 €/kW for wind onshore and
3,555 €/kW for wind offshore. Given that our study focuses on 2030, we will use the
assumptions for 2025 as baseline technology costs. However, we have also carried out
the analysis using the higher 2015 cost values as a robustness check. Moreover, these
assumptions will be varied in a number of additional sensitivity analyses the results of
which are presented in section 3.4. In terms of fixed operating and maintenance costs,
we assume 1% of the specific investment costs per year for solar PV and 2% for wind
onshore and wind offshore. The lifetime of the investment is assumed to be 20 years for all
considered technologies. Again, we will vary this assumption (see section 3.5) to explore
the impact of longer/shorter lifetimes.
3 Results
We now present the results of our analysis. Section 3.1 provides an overview of the achieved
RES-E shares by country and technology in 2030, whereas section 3.2 provides insights
into the different technologies’ profitability in each country. Subsequently, sections 3.3-3.5
illustrate the impact on the IRR when varying the assumptions in relation to fuel prices,
technology costs and lifetime respectively. Finally, section 3.6 provides insights into the
relation between RES shares and emissions.
3.1 RES-E shares
First, we calculate the renewable penetration using the model results. With our assump-
tions including the demand and generation portfolio from PRIMES, the share of renewable
electricity generation (hydro, solar, wind, biomass and other renewables) is 49% of the total
European electricity demand. This is in line with the recommendation by EU Commission
Staff [40] to meet the EU 2030 target in relation to total energy demand.
Figure 1 examines the proportion between RES-E generation and demand for each EU
country (plus Switzerland and Norway). Figure 1 shows that Switzerland and countries
in Scandinavia, e.g., Denmark and Norway, have the highest RES-E over demand pro-
portion. These countries are followed by Austria (driven by their hydro power capacities,
11
similar to Norway and Switzerland), the UK and a couple of Southern-European coun-
tries such as Portugal (79%), Greece (66%) and Spain (57%). Figure 1 also shows that
countries with a very high overall RES-E share but without significant hydro capacities
(e.g., Denmark and the UK) have rather high shares of other (thermal) RES-E. More-
over, it shows that with very few exceptions, the wind onshore shares are higher than
the solar power shares. Overall, Figure 1 reveals that the expected RES shares in 2030
differ significantly across Europe. Because of differing RES-E capacity factors (mainly
influenced by the geographical and meteorological conditions) and wholesale electricity
market price levels and structures, we also expect the profitability of RES investments
to differ strongly between countries. As for all models of this kind, electricity prices in
our model are largely determined by the fuel and carbon prices assumed so they change
accordingly with our assumptions in the different scenarios we considered. We assume
that interconnection capacities between the countries have been realised according to the
10 year network development plan (TYNDP). As a result, electricity may flow between
the EU countries, leading to price convergence across the states. Thus, for our baseline
assumptions, electricity prices range between 60 and 70 €/MWh for all countries, with
the exception of France (where prices are lower - mainly because of nuclear power) and
Poland (where prices are higher - mainly because of old coal power).
In the following subsections, we therefore analyse the profitability of solar PV, wind
onshore and wind offshore according to the PRIMES model based on their economic
performance in 2030 for each member state aimed at understanding which countries have
favourable conditions for which technologies.
0.0%
20.0%
40.0%
60.0%
80.0%
100.0%
120.0%
HU LU C
Z
M
T PL LT EE SK CY BE BG FR N
L SI IT IE DE RO L
V
HR F
I
ES G
R SE UK P
T NI AT NO D
K
CH
RE
S 
sh
ar
e
 (%
)
Countries
Wind onshore Wind offshore Solar PV Other RES Hydro
Figure 1: Proportion of RES generation on total demand, 2030
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3.2 Profitability of investment in RES-E
Figure 2 provides an overview of the profitability of the three considered RES-E technolo-
gies across Europe on the basis of both the IRR and the NPVs. The IRR of wind onshore
investments increases from the left to the right. For the baseline fuel price and technology
cost assumptions, investments in wind onshore have a higher IRR than those in solar PV
for half of the countries, while solar PV has a higher IRR for the other half. The IRR of
wind offshore is negative throughout.
Broadly speaking, four categories of countries can be identified. First, there are a
number of countries (e.g., in Scandinavia and other parts of Northern or Western Europe)
where wind onshore is rather profitable, whereas the profitability of solar PV is low. Sec-
ond, there is a group of countries in the South-Eastern part of Central Europe where solar
PV is rather profitable, whereas wind onshore investments reach their lowest IRRs (e.g.,
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria). Third, there are some countries in
Central Europe where the profitability of both solar PV and wind onshore is rather low
(e.g., Luxembourg, Lithuania and Slovenia). Fourth, there are a few countries in Southern
Europe with coastal access where the profitability of both technologies is rather high (e.g.,
Portugal, Greece and Cyprus).
Looking at the investment in solar power, Italy, with a large capacity of solar PV
installed, has the highest IRR for this technology, followed by other countries in Southern
Europe (Malta, Greece, Cyprus and Portugal). Looking at the investment in wind onshore,
the Netherlands, Cyprus and Greece achieve the highest IRRs, followed by a number
of Scandinavian countries (Finland, Denmark, Sweden) and the UK. The situation is
structurally similar for wind offshore investments. This technology achieves the relatively
highest IRR in the Netherlands, followed by Finland, Denmark and the UK. However, for
the baseline technology cost assumptions, this relatively highest IRR in the Netherlands
is still negative.
When assuming today’s (2015) technology costs as a robustness check without a de-
crease over time, it is interesting that wind onshore investments are more profitable than
solar PV investments for all considered countries. In terms of the achieved IRRs, there
is a step change in terms of the IRR levels of solar PV investments, whereas the IRR
of wind onshore investments only decreases by around 2%. This is mainly driven by the
much stronger cost reduction assumptions until 2025 in the case of solar PV as compared
to wind onshore. This underlines the importance of reducing PV technology costs from
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today’s levels in order to ensure sufficiently high IRRs for this technology across Europe.
It is interesting to observe that the rank order (between countries) for the NPV com-
pared to the IRR differs strongly, e.g., for wind onshore where there is cost of capital
data available almost across all of Europe. There is a group of five countries (Germany,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands) that stand out in terms of the wind
onshore NPVs. While there are places in Southern Europe, such as Greece or Cyprus,
which range among the areas with the highest IRRs, the NPVs are around zero because
of much higher country-specific capital risks (lower financial stability).
Overall, investments in wind onshore seem generally profitable in several Northern
European countries, where both meteorological and financial conditions are beneficial for
this technology. Wind onshore also achieves a high IRR in some countries on the Mediter-
ranean or Atlantic coast, the latter having favourable resource conditions for both solar
PV and wind onshore. However, the financial conditions are much less stable for most of
these countries leading to higher costs of capital and lower NPVs. Finally, a number of
countries in Central and Eastern Europe neither have favourable conditions for PV nor
wind - neither from a resource perspective nor from a cost of capital perspective. This
raises the question if the import of renewable energy (certificates) from EU countries with
more favourable conditions could be a viable option for these countries. Whether such
an approach would really lead to meeting the RES targets at reduced costs, however,
depends on many factors. For instance, shifting RES investments to countries with more
favourable RES conditions may challenge the power grid and require grid reinforcements,
which may lead to higher costs than a more balanced distribution of RES investments
across EU countries. This question should therefore be part of future research.
In the next sections we stress our hypothesis by changing the fuel prices, technology
costs and the lifetimes of the investments. In the absence of cost of capital data across
technologies and countries, the sensitivity analysis presented in the following sections will
focus on comparing the natural resource-driven aspects of profitability across Europe by
means of the IRR.
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3.3 Impact of fuel price variations on the profitability of RES-E invest-
ments
Figures 3 and 4 show how the IRRs of the different RES-E investments change when fuel
prices (and hence electricity prices) are higher or lower than the baseline assumptions
(see Table 3 for the corresponding assumptions in the High and Low scenarios), while the
technology costs are not changed. As expected, higher fuel prices increase the profitability
of solar PV (see Figure 3a). Italy and Malta still achieve the highest IRRs for solar
investments, now exceeding 18%. However, a number of countries in which the IRR was
below 5% for the baseline assumptions now achieve an IRR of 8-9% (e.g., Scandinavia,
the UK or Ireland). On average, the IRR increases by around 4% in the High fuel price
scenario compared to the baseline fuel price scenario. In contrast, lower fuel prices result in
IRRs around or below zero for solar investments for some countries (e.g., France, the UK,
Ireland and Scandinavia). On average, the IRRs are around 5.5% lower in this scenario
than for the baseline assumptions.
Figure 3b shows similar effects for wind onshore. On average, the IRRs are around
4.5% higher in the High fuel price scenario compared to the baseline scenario. Lower fuel
prices result in IRRs that are around 6.1% lower on average than in the baseline scenario
for this technology. This means that the IRRs for wind onshore investments are negative
for some countries, including Slovenia, Luxembourg, Lithuania, Bulgaria and the Czech
Republic, while Hungary and Romania yield IRRs of around zero under these fuel prices.
Figure 4 shows how wind offshore investments are affected by the different fuel price
scenarios. In the scenario with high fuel prices, the IRRs are around 3.5% higher on
average than under the baseline assumptions. While in the baseline scenario the IRRs
for wind offshore were negative across Europe, the IRR is slighty positive under high fuel
prices in the Netherlands (around 0.5%), followed by Finland and Denmark. Under low
fuel prices, the IRRs of wind onshore would be strictly negative across Europe (around
6.4% lower on average than for the baseline assumptions), whereby the order between the
countries remains largely unchanged.
Overall it is interesting to note that the fuel price variations do not have the exact
same impact on all countries. For instance, Figure 3b shows that for wind onshore, the
order between the countries would be slightly different under the High scenario than under
the Baseline scenario. This can be explained by different power systems and generation
portfolios, which are affected by the fuel price variations in different ways.
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Figure 4: Impact of fuel price variations on the IRR of wind offshore investments across
Europe, 2030
3.4 Impact of technology cost variations on the profitability of RES-E
investments
For the considered technologies, the study by Taylor et al. [39] suggests that there will be
huge reductions of investment-related costs by 2025. However, there is obviously also a
very high uncertainty related to these reductions, which is yet higher in our case given that
our analysis is based on 2030. A thorough sensitivity analysis of the impact of changes
in technology costs on the profitability of RES-E investments is therefore very important.
We shall do this using fuel price assumptions of the baseline scenario.
Figure 5a shows how the IRR of solar PV investments changes across Europe when
the specific investment costs of solar PV vary between 500 e/kW and 1,750 e/kW (where
Taylor et al. [39] expect 711 e/kW by 2025). It becomes obvious that such cost reductions
lead to a step change in profitability of PV across Europe. Already a slightly less ambitious
reduction to 1,000 e/kW would result in positive IRRs for the vast majority of countries
in Europe and in IRRs around or above 5% for a third of the member states.
Figure 5b shows how specific investment costs of wind onshore varying between 1,000
e/kW and 2,000 e/kW affect the IRR of wind onshore across Europe (where Taylor et al.
[39] expect 1,233 e/kW by 2025). If technology costs of wind onshore remained unchanged
or increased slightly, the IRRs would still be positive in most countries. However, if the
specific investment costs fell to around 1,000 e/kW, the IRRs would exceed 5% across
Europe, while for two thirds of the countries they would exceed 10%.
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Figure 6: Impact of technology cost variations on the IRR of wind offshore investments
across Europe, 2030
Figure 6 shows how technology cost variations between 2,000 e/kW and 3,500 e/kW
would affect wind offshore investments. While Taylor et al. [39] expect 3,555 e/kW by
2025, Figure 6 shows that reductions to 2,000 e/kW would be necessary to achieve a
positive IRR in most countries with wind offshore potential. However, even for such
significant cost reductions, the IRR would not exceed 5% in any of the countries, which
may not be sufficient to make this a viable investment given the scale of offshore projects.
3.5 Impact of lifetime variations on RES-E investments
We now explore how changes in the expected lifetime of solar and wind projects affect their
profitability, where our baseline assumption is 20 years (see section 2.2). Figure 7 shows
that for both solar PV and wind onshore, decreasing the lifetime expectation to 15 years
would result in IRRs that are around 2% lower on average. An increase in the lifetime of
the projects would have a slightly lower positive effect. The IRRs for both technologies
would be around 1% higher for a lifetime of 25 years (compared to 20 years), while the
IRRs would increase by another 0.5% for a lifetime of 30 years (compared to 25 years).
Furthermore, Figure 7a shows for solar PV investments that a lifetime reduction to 15
years would lead to an IRR of below 4% in almost 50% of the countries. An increased
lifetime of 25 years, however, would ensure an IRR of at least 6% in almost all countries.
For wind onshore, Figure 7b shows that the IRR would fall below 6% if the lifetime was
reduced to 15 years. A lifetime increase to 25 years, would ensure an IRR of at least 8%
for two thirds of the countries. However, countries in Northern Europe (Estonia, Finland,
Sweden and Norway) and Western Europe (Belgium, UK, Netherlands) as well as Cyprus
and Greece achieve IRRs of around or higher than 8% for all considered lifetime scenarios.
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Figure 8: Impact of lifetime variations on the IRR of wind offshore investments across
Europe, 2030
Figure 8 shows that the IRR of wind offshore investments is yet more sensitive to
lifetime variations than the IRR of wind onshore or PV. A lifetime reduction of offshore
projects to 15 years would come along with IRRs that are around 4.5% lower on average.
A lifetime increase to 25 years would lead to IRRs that are around 2.5% higher on average
(compared to 20 years), while the IRRs would increase by another 1.5% for a lifetime of
30 years (compared to 25 years). However, with the exception of an assumed lifetime of
30 years in the Netherlands the IRRs remain negative under all lifetime scenarios for the
baseline technology cost and fuel price assumptions.
3.6 Relation between RES shares and CO2 emissions
Figure 9 shows the relative RES shares and specific CO2 emissions for each of the con-
sidered countries. This comparison is highly relevant since RES expansion is one of the
main pillars of EU policy to achieve the overall target of 40% GHG emission reduction
[3, 5]. As expected, Figure 9 shows that countries with very high RES shares, such as
Austria, Switzerland or Norway have very low specific CO2 emissions, whereas countries
with very low RES shares in 2030, such as Poland, have much higher specific CO2 emis-
sions. It is interesting to observe, however, that countries with moderate and very similar
RES shares, such as Italy, Ireland and Germany, differ significantly in terms of their spe-
cific CO2 emissions, where Germany is found to have the second-highest specific emissions
in Europe. This can be explained by the different power system structures. While the
three countries are similar in terms of their RES shares, they differ with respect to their
conventional power generation technologies. Italy and Ireland have a gas-dominated con-
ventional power generation system, whereas Germany’s conventional power generation is
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Figure 9: RES shares and specific CO2 emissions across Europe, 2030
still dominated by coal-fired power plants. In the absence of any relevant carbon price
(floor), this results in (less carbon-intensive but more expensive) gas-fired generation being
pushed out of the market in Germany, whereas the (more carbon-intensive and cheaper)
coal-fired generation remains in the market. This finding also holds for other countries
with a relevant share of coal capacities, such as Poland or the Netherlands but it is most
relevant for Germany in the light of its high total demand resulting in the highest absolute
CO2 emissions in Europe, followed by Poland. To summarise, Figure 9 shows that the
effectiveness of RES in terms of reducing CO2 emissions depends to a large degree on the
power system structure and the carbon pricing policy.
4 Discussion
The results in the previous section highlight that the market-based profitability of RES-E
investments differs substantially across Europe. While some technologies are profitable in
some countries without any additional subsidies, the same or other technologies are not
profitable in other countries. Consequently, if all countries, for whatever reason, sought to
deploy all RES technologies within their own jurisdiction, additional incentives would need
to be provided to investors, which would ultimately be borne by the consumers. In theory
this suggests that, as long as interconnection capacities between countries are sufficiently
high, it would be more efficient to export renewable generation from countries in which
natural and financial conditions incentivise the development of renewable generation to
other countries in which these conditions are less favourable. However, the issue of trading
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so-called Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs) or Guarantees of Origin (GOs) is debated
controversially. While those in favour of an approach for cross-border trading of renewables
[e.g., 41] would broadly follow the same arguments outlined above, those against such an
approach [e.g., 42] would typically highlight the administrative barriers and increasing
risk for investors ultimately turning into increased costs to consumers. In contrast, Green
et al. [43] propose a market design aimed at facilitating long-distance trading of renewable
energy, hence mitigating existing barriers. Altogether, it should be noted that our analysis
across the EU focusses on 2030 and shows that the considered RES technologies can be
profitable in quite a few countries without any subsidies, largely driven by cost reductions
of RES technologies. This suggests that spikes of REC prices as anticipated by Haas
et al. [44] for trading-based RES support systems within individual countries should not
be expected, at least not to the same extent.
In this paper, we present IRRs and NPVs for different RES-E technologies across
Europe. For an adequate interpretation, it is important to note that these have been
calculated using wholesale electricity prices and a uniform payback period of 20 years.
We acknowledge, however, that in reality there are different investors with different ex-
pectations and considerations. Energy companies or investment funds are likely investors
in wind onshore capacities [45], which suggests that the use of wholesale electricity prices
is adequate. In the case of solar PV, on the other hand, and indeed some wind onshore
projects, likely investors also include non-energy companies [46], whose investment consid-
erations would be based on industrial tariffs rather than wholesale prices. In addition, the
perception of regulatory or technology-related risks are important determinants of (energy
as well as non-energy) firms’ investment behaviour [47]. Finally, residential households
are very likely investors for small-scale solar PV assets. Their investment considerations
are usually based on residential retail tariffs as well as a number of non-economic as-
pects, such as investing in green technologies or achieving a certain level of autonomy
[48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53]). For the latter two (investments by non-energy companies and
residential households), the IRR estimates based on wholesale prices should therefore be
understood as lower boundaries as the wholesale prices are only one component of the
total industrial and residential retail tariffs. Moreover, costs of capital will vary between
investors (e.g., between household-level and utility-scale PV investments), which will have
a major impact on NPV calculations.
Overall, the rates of return required to undertake an investment in RES technologies
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vary significantly between different types of investors [54] and may also vary across coun-
tries. For instance, our results (see Figure 2) show that the IRR of solar PV investments
is below 7% for around half of the countries, which may not be enough to incentivise util-
ities to invest in this technology [55]. For residential households, studies show that these
face a market interest rate between 1% and 3% [56, 57] and may consider 15 years as a
reasonable payback period for their investment. At the household level, the investment in
solar PV may therefore be undertaken in most of the countries by 2030 (see Figure 7a).
As for wind offshore, it is interesting to observe that this technology is almost never
profitable in our analysis, which concurs with findings by Green and Vasilakos [58] and
Duscha et al. [16]. However, in recent auctions held in Germany for instance, investors
submitted bids for wind offshore projects without any financial support.8 One possible
reason could be that the investors expect strong reductions in investment costs associated
with this technology [59]. However, our analysis on the impact of technology cost variations
(see Figure 6) shows that even for a reduction of wind offshore investment costs to 2,000
€/kW (i.e. a reduction to around 50% of today’s costs), the IRR does not exceed 5% in
any of the countries and does not exceed 3% in most countries. In order to understand
under which conditions wind offshore may become profitable, we carried out an additional
sensitivity analysis on the corresponding capacity factors. For this purpose, we increased
the capacity factors of wind offshore in all countries proportionally reflecting technological
improvements. With a capacity factor between 40 and 50% for all the countries with wind
offshore potential, however, we still find that capital costs above 2,500 €/kW result in IRRs
below 6% for all countries. This suggests that there may be other considerations behind
these wind offshore bids. Either, the investors expect lower technology costs in combination
with high fuel prices and/or longer lifetimes or they may evaluate the importance of
entering in this market as a strategic option and may re-evaluate their investment decisions
over time, e.g., as information about new support schemes (to be put in place by 2030)
becomes available [60]. However, such ‘wait-and-see’ strategies have been proven to be
detrimental [61]. We acknowledge that all these factors are crucial to understand the
strategy of the investors in wind offshore but they cannot be included within the scope of
this paper.
While the focus of this paper is the assessment of the economic viability of different
renewable technologies across Europe on the basis of the IRR and (partly) NPV, there are
8https://www.cleanenergywire.org/news/support-free-bids-again-germanys-second-offshore-wind-auction
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non-economic considerations which are important, in particular for policy makers, in the
context of RES-E deployment. Above, we already mentioned non-economic determinants
of investments such as the willingness to pay for ‘green investments’ or autonomy. Another
crucial aspect for the successful and timely deployment of renewables is the public accep-
tance of these investments, i.e. not the acceptance by those investing but by those who
are affected by the investments [e.g., 62, 63]. Acceptance of renewable technologies usu-
ally depends on the technology type (e.g., solar vs. wind), the size of the investment and
the geographical distance between the built capacity and the people affected [64, 65, 66].
For instance, studies show that (i) the social acceptance of renewable projects is inversely
related to the geographical proximity to residential dwellings and (ii) that the acceptance
of solar PV is much higher than that of wind onshore even at very low distances to peo-
ple’s homes [e.g., 62, 66, 67]. Moreover, existing research has found that in some regions
the public acceptance of wind offshore is higher than that of wind onshore [68]. This is
important to understand for both policy makers and investors as such considerations of
public acceptance may counterbalance the economic advantages of wind onshore to some
extent. While policy makers might give preference to solar PV or even wind offshore
instead of wind onshore with the objective of ensuring a timely achievement of the Euro-
pean renewable energy targets, investors might give preference to solar PV hoping to avoid
project delays. Overall, this underlines the importance of understanding the investment
economics and public acceptance of different RES-E technologies as well as the tradeoffs
people make and their willingness to pay for the second-cheapest or even third-cheapest
RES-E technologies if their acceptance levels are higher. The analysis presented in this
paper is one contribution to resolving this conundrum.
Finally, the analysis in the previous section has highlighted that renewable deploy-
ment alone does not guarantee an effective reduction of CO2 emissions. Depending on
the power system structure and carbon price levels, renewables may push gas-fired gen-
eration out of the market rather than coal-fired generation, which has a limited effect
on emission reduction. As a result, we have identified Germany as the country with the
second-highest specific and highest absolute CO2 emissions in Europe, which shows the
limitations of Germany’s “Energiewende” policy to date. It is important to note though
that Germany has recently decided to phase out coal-fired power generation through a reg-
ulatory mechanism. Given the time line of the planned coal phaseout (last unit is planned
to be decommissioned in 2038), however, the assumption that Germany has “solved” the
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problem would be misleading. Since it is not merely relevant to reduce emissions until
a certain target year but the cumulative emissions should not exceed a certain carbon
budget, Germany’s power generation sector should still be a matter of concern. A regu-
latory plan to phase out coal-fired power generation will do little to the emissions of each
coal-fired power station until the final shut-down. Instead, an appropriate carbon price
floor should be introduced, which ensures a fuel switch from coal to gas. This would be
a helpful instrument, complementing both RES deployment and coal phase-out, since it
would increase the effectiveness of RES in terms of emission reduction. This recommen-
dation is in line with previous work by Kalkuhl et al. [69] and Huntington et al. [14], who
both suggest that it is usually most efficient to price externalities directly.
As for all quantitative studies, the analysis and results presented in this paper come
along with some limitations and therefore need to be interpreted with caution. For coun-
tries and technologies, where cost of capital data is available (e.g., wind onshore for most
countries), we calculate the internal rate of return (IRR) as well as the net present value
(NPV). While the NPVs include aspects of financial market conditions by considering
country-specific and technology-specific costs of capital, the IRRs only focus on the (natu-
ral) resource-driven aspects of profitability. Consequently, conclusions about the financial
feasibility of projects can only be drawn for wind onshore projects in most countries,
whereas for the other two technologies considered, such conclusions are not possible for
most countries in the absence of the required cost of capital information. This is impor-
tant to bear in mind when interpreting the results since the rank orders according to the
IRR as compared to the NPV may vary significantly between countries (see Figure 2 as
well as [26, 27]). Moreover, Ceseña et al. [70] as well as Santos et al. [71] highlight that a
real option analysis would be better suited than the IRR methodology, in particular when
investors face uncertainty and may postpone their investment decision. However, in the
framework in this paper, we consider only one year (2030) and we acknowledge the sim-
plifying assumption that the projects have constant annual cash flows over their lifetime.
Nevertheless, the IRRs and NPVs assessed here, give a sound estimate of the profitability
of each project, and (in our specific case) is also a good measure to compare projects
between different countries. Moreover, in order to calculate the costs associated with the
investment in renewable generation, we assume that the costs of solar and wind technolo-
gies are the same across Europe. We acknowledge that this is a simplifying hypothesis
that may be changed in future work. Finally, our analysis is based on the PRIMES 2016
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scenario for 2030, which does not exactly match the recent EU target to achieve 32% of
renewables in final energy consumption by 2030 (see [34]). For some countries, we can
already see that the PRIMES scenario used here has underestimated the dynamics of RES
developments. Assuming that the actual RES shares in some countries are higher than
assumed in the scenarios, we can expect that – ceteris paribus – the power prices would be
slightly lower reducing the profitability of RES investments. At the same time, however,
a faster RES expansion may be accompanied by stronger technology cost reductions and
possibly WACC reductions (because of reduced perceived risk), which in turn would be
positive for the profitability of renewables. The extent to which these competing effects
balance out is impossible to anticipate but it is important to be aware of this uncertainty
when interpreting the results of the analysis.
5 Conclusions
This work has estimated the market-based profitablity calculating IRRs and NPVs for
different renewable technology investments across Europe, i.e. no financial support for
renewables outside the market is assumed. The analysis focuses on solar PV as well as
wind power (onshore as well as offshore) and uses both the net present value (NPV)
and the internal rate of return (IRR) as indicators to compare the profitability between
technologies and countries.
We show that investments in the considered technologies are not homogeneously prof-
itable across Europe. Our results reveal four categories of countries. The first category
includes a number of countries in Scandinavia and other parts of Northern or Western
Europe where wind onshore has a rather high IRR, while the IRR of solar PV is low.
The second category consists of a group of countries in the South-Eastern part of Central
Europe (e.g., the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria) where solar PV has
a rather high IRR, whereas wind onshore investments achieve very low IRRs. The third
category includes countries in Central Europe (e.g., Luxembourg, Lithuania and Slovenia)
where neither solar PV nor wind onshore achieve particularly high IRRs. Finally, the
fourth category consists of countries in Southern Europe with coastal access (e.g., Portu-
gal, Greece and Cyprus) where the IRRs of both solar PV and wind onshore are rather
high. Wind offshore is not found to be profitable under our baseline assumptions.
Country-specific risks also play a role in determining the profitability of the investments
through the cost of capital. The NPVs calculated for wind onshore projects (the only
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technology for which data on the cost of capital are available for most of the countries)
highlight that the profitability of investments is strongly linked to each country’s financial
market conditions. As a result, several countries in Southern and Eastern Europe with
IRRs for wind onshore in the upper half (above 6%) only have a marginally positive (or
even negative) NPV.
We also carried out a number of sensitivity analyses to explore the impact of varying
key factors, such as the fuel prices, technology costs and technology lifetimes. Our analysis
shows that a reduction in the lifetime of the projects, increased technology costs / less than
anticipated technology cost reductions by 2030 and lower fuel prices significantly reduce
the profitability of wind and solar investments. More specifically, we observe that the
downside risks and the upside potentials of the investments are distributed asymmetrically,
i.e. the downside risk of lower fuel prices and shorter technology lifetimes is larger than the
corresponding upside potential of higher fuel prices and longer lifetimes. In contrast, the
upside potential of decreased technology costs is larger than the downside risk of increased
costs. All these factors need to be taken into account when assessing if investments in
renewables will meet the 2030 targets in the absence of any financial supports by Member
States or what form and level of support may be required in different countries.
There are a number of messages that policy-makers can take away from this research.
First, our analysis shows that allowing for some form of trading renewable generation
between countries or providing some other mechanism for joint target achievement / co-
operation between European countries (as opposed to national targets that have to be met
nationally only) can be expected to achieve the overall targets at lower costs. Comparing
the 2030 target shares (Figure 1) and profitabilities (Figure 2) reveals that some countries
have high RES-E targets while the profitability is rather moderate or low and vice versa.
This suggests that either financial support payments will be required (ultimately leading
to higher costs to consumers) to meet the targets in these countries or the targets may not
be met. Trading of renewable generation between countries can resolve both problems.
Should countries, for whatever reason, wish to achieve certain technology-specific national
targets, our analysis provides quantitative support in determining which technologies need
support in which countries. Moreover, our analysis shows that in most countries at least
one technology (wind onshore or solar PV) achieve reasonable IRRs by 2030 even in ab-
sence of any financial support payments. Second, our analyses provide insights for policy
makers as to how sensitive a successful RES deployment and target achievement are to
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uncertainties related to different factors. For technology developers, these analyses can
be used to derive targets in relation to technology cost reductions and lifetimes. Third,
our results show that in quite a few countries, wind onshore achieves higher IRRs than
solar PV, and definitively higher than those of wind offshore. Beyond these economic
considerations, however, the public acceptance of energy infrastructure investments is a
prerequisite for a successful deployment of renewables, which has been shown to be higher
for solar PV and wind offshore compared to wind onshore in many cases as discussed
in section 4. It is therefore crucial for policy makers to have an open and transparent
discourse about the tradeoff people make between consumer costs (depending, amongst
others, on the profitability of investments) and acceptance related to different renewable
technologies. The analyses presented in this paper provide an important contribution to
understanding the investment economic side of this tradeoff. Fourth, RES deployment
alone will not guarantee an effective reduction of CO2 emissions. If accompanied by an
appropriate carbon price (floor), however, renewables would unfold their full power in
mitigating carbon emissions.
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Appendix
Table 4: Conventional capacities installed (2030)
CCGT fleet Coal fleet Nuclear fleet OCGT fleet Oil fleet
AT 2338 778 0 260 423
BE 9298 16 0 1033 215
BG 938 3391 1920 104 2
CH 636 0 1200 144 0
CY 462 0 0 51 930
CZ 1526 8797 4006 170 64
DE 22560 36775 0 2507 1248
DK 899 1472 0 100 217
EE 214 1408 0 24 0
ES 25106 3968 7399 2790 2952
FI 2818 1844 3398 313 607
FR 7000 0 59493 778 1679
GR 4264 2845 0 474 733
HR 1050 658 0 117 107
HU 2226 396 4482 247 5
IE 2848 842 0 316 173
IT 37497 5098 0 4166 2332
LT 1215 0 1117 135 0
LU 614 0 0 68 4
LV 982 21 0 109 15
MT 641 0 0 71 144
NI 875 0 0 97 307
NL 10562 4429 485 1174 66
NO 700 0 0 215 45
PL 4494 20704 0 499 155
PT 3931 0 0 437 691
RO 3559 1909 2828 395 676
SE 2840 128 6949 316 510
SI 364 632 700 40 16
SK 901 483 4020 100 84
UK 30470 501 13107 3386 860
Data are from PRIMES Reference Scenario, 2016
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